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Abstract
The main scope of this study is to investigate the effects of competition and
liquidity constraints on the cyclical behaviour of the markup ratio. In particu-
lar, 79 2-digit NACE Rev.2 sectors across the UK manufacturing and services
industry over 2008–2017 are taken into account in order to observe markup
cyclicality and whether pricing decisions are significantly influenced by the
degree of competition and liquidity restrictions. A panel VAR framework is
used to take into account the presence of cross-section dependence and hetero-
geneity amongst the regressors of the model. The empirical results provide the
following significant insights: (a) the markup ratio across the UK sectors fol-
lows a countercyclical pattern, (b) concentrated sectors tend to charge counter-
cyclical price–cost margins as they attempt to increase their market share in
normal periods and (c) sectors with liquidity constrained firms charge counter-
cyclical markups in order to substitute lack of funding with additional reve-
nue. Complementary findings also suggest that more profitable firms charge
procyclical markup ratios, thus validating predatory pricing strategies in more
concentrated sectors.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Firms across industries tend to form their pricing strate-
gies according to expected consumer demand and various
supply factors contributing in the production process.
There is sufficient empirical evidence that two of the
most important supply factors influencing pricing deci-
sions are the degree of competition within sectors and
the degree of firm accessibility to liquidity
(Badinger, 2007; Bellone, Musso, Nesta, &
Warzynski, 2016; Bernanke, Gertler, & Gilchrist, 1996;
Braun & Larrain, 2005). Firms can use their market
power to increase their revenue either through higher
selling prices, when demand is inelastic, or through
lower prices when demand is quite elastic. Therefore,
price wars occur among the competitors.
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Nevertheless, a firm's strategy is highly shaped by the
value of assets, the efficiency of capital equipment and
ultimately, by access to credit that will be used to fund
the production process. For this reason, liquidity needs
vary across sectors as more competitive firms may require
additional funding. Any barriers restricting access to
liquidity may force firms to reduce investment on labour
and capital equipment, thus leading to reduced produc-
tion (Braun & Raddatz, 2016; Raddatz, 2006).
Liquidity constraints may force firms to obtain
additional funding through pricing decisions shaped by
the nature of competition and business cycles.
According to Chevalier and Scharfstein (1995, 1996),
firms can exploit their market power during normal
periods by charging lower prices. The duration of this
strategy depends on the degree of available funding as
firms with higher liquidity constraints will not be able
to maintain low prices for long. Moreover, markups
are much less likely to decline over recessions as firms
wish to maximize consumer surplus exploitation from
their existing consumers. If competition is quite
intense, firms may engage in price wars even over a
downturn as higher market shares may result in
higher revenue in the short-run. This means that pric-
ing strategies highly depend on the competitive struc-
ture of markets and the degree of available liquidity
that can be invested in the production process.
This study takes into account the aforementioned
process and investigates the role of competitive condi-
tions and liquidity constraints on the cyclicality of
markups. When uneven liquidity constraints arise among
firms, it is expected that predatory pricing strategies will
be adopted by less liquidity constrained firms in the
short-run. This strategy occurs as the main intention is to
weaken or even force competitors to exit the market
(Rotemberg & Saloner, 1986). Therefore, the outcome of
this process could suggest more coutnercyclical markup
ratios across industries with such characteristics. Many
studies in the literature investigate the effects of competi-
tion and liquidity constraints on pricing decisions across
many countries (Bottasso & Sembenelli, 2001; Braun &
Raddatz, 2016; Busse, 2002; Chevalier & Scharfstein, 1995,
1996; Hoberg & Phillips, 2010; Makaew &
Maksimovic, 2013). They take into account the degree of
firm heterogeneity within markets and report various
outcomes on this relationship.1
For this reason, the present analysis considers a large
number of UK manufacturing and services firms grouped
into 79 2-digit NACE Rev.2 sectors over 2008–2017 in
order to investigate the effects of competition and liquid-
ity constraints on the cyclicality of markup. The UK
economy is characterized by highly competitive charac-
teristics across the OECD group as firms tend to increase
their market share by charging a selling price close to the
marginal cost of production (Afonso & Costa, 2013;
Amountzias, 2018; Christopoulou & Vermeulen, 2012;
Görg & Warzynski, 2003, 2006; Polemis & Fotis, 2016).
This aspect makes it an interesting case study as intense
competitive interactions may provide different results
compared to other economies.
The methodology provided by De Loecker and
Warzynski (2012) and Hall (1988) and Roeger (1995) is
used in order to estimate the markup ratio charged by
the constituent UK sectors.2 Subsequently, a panel Vector
Autoregression (VAR) framework will be used to take
into account the issues of cross section dependence and
heterogeneity as a pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
estimation technique may result in incorrect inferences.
The final estimates will reflect the behaviour of markups
across the sectors and whether they are influenced by the
explanatory variables capturing the effects of competition
and liquidity. Therefore, the findings of this paper aim to
complement the existing literature and provide an inter-
pretation of how UK firms tend to set their selling prices
under the pressure of restricted funding and competition.
Moreover, as the UK markets are considered to be more
competitive compared to other OECD markets, it is of
great importance to investigate whether liquidity restric-
tions cause markup ratios to be more procyclical or coun-
tercyclical as the existing literature has not still reached a
conclusive outcome (Braun & Raddatz, 2016).
This article is organized as follows: Section 2 provides
the theoretical and empirical literature on competition,
liquidity constraints and markups; Section 3 presents the
methodological approach and data collection; Section 4
discusses the empirical findings; and Section 5 offers a
conclusion.
2 | LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 | Market competition and markups
Competing firms try to attract customers by satisfying
their preferences through various strategies. One of the
most important elements of such strategies are price set-
ting decisions as consumers always prefer a lower price
for the same product. For this reason, firms may compete
in prices according to their available funding and
resources and thus, they try to increase their market
share given the elasticity of demand in the market.
Stigler (1964) and Green and Porter (1984) argue that
firms may adopt this particular rationale when overall
conditions in the market improve and thus, consumers
are willing to spend more for consumption. Under this
assumption, firms will try to increase their market share
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by charging prices close to the marginal cost of produc-
tion attempting to attract as many customers as possible.3
Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) also argue that collud-
ing oligopolies behave more competitive during periods
of high demand to increase their market share. Collu-
sions tend to charge lower markups over normal periods
in order to avoid any defection that could break down
their agreement. Such behaviour has macroeconomic
effects as an increase in demand for the products of oli-
gopolies will lead to an increase in competition by effi-
ciently boosting output. Price wars may occur in times of
expansion due to the relationship between business
cycles and slow price adjustment. Therefore, markups
reflect a countercyclical behaviour as firms tend to
reduce their prices when the market is larger, especially
when available funding and resources allow such strate-
gies to occur for some time.4
Moreover, competitive interactions depend on several
market factors, such as the structure of the industry or
the nature of the final product. As the manufacturing
and services industries are the main contributors to
national GDP across many economies, there are many
empirical studies putting to test the aforementioned theo-
retical relationship between concentration and price set-
ting decisions.5 Ariga, Ohkusa, and Nishimura (1999)
and Volpe, Okrent, and Kuhns (2017) argue that market
concentration is a crucial determinant of markups as
more concentrated firms take into account factors such
as advertising and sales promotion efforts to increase
their market share. When this is achieved, they tend to
increase the selling price of products as consumers set
their preferences for the products of those particular
firms. Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005, 2006) also support
that less concentrated sectors tend to invest in technolog-
ical advancement in order to boost their productivity and
increase their market share. This process enhances the
quality of their products and they become more attractive
to customers.6 McAdam et al. (2019) find the same out-
come for the Euro Area markets by highlighting their
propensity to invest in high technologies, thus boosting
their operational growth rates. As they tend to invest in
high technology projects, the dynamics of the price–cost
margin over the years has remained quite stable
reflecting the market power acquired through such
investment decisions.
Moreover, Mishra (2008) reports the significance of a
positive relationship between market concentration and
pricing decisions; however, the core argument of this
study is that external structural factors, such as govern-
ment regulations, may break this relationship and force
concentrated sectors to behave competitively. This out-
come may occur when barriers to entry are relatively low
so new entrants can enjoy an equivalent competitive
advantage with the incumbent firms and thus, establish
their presence in the market. Cerullo et al. (2018) also
argue that the structural nature of markets highly influ-
ence the competitive interactions among firms. In partic-
ular, they support that hospitals with for-profit status in
highly concentrated markets do not necessarily charge
higher markups compared to public/private not-for-profit
status as their findings vary according to the degree of
concentration across different markets. Therefore, struc-
tural and institutional elements significantly shape the
pricing decisions of firms.
An additional factor influencing pricing decisions is
the structural characteristics and domestic exposure to
international markets through imports and exports. Liu
and Ma (2015) support that market structure is an impor-
tant determinant of market power exercise along with
international trade interactions. As the price of imported
inputs highly influence the cost of production, less com-
petitive importers tend to increase the markup ratio
when input tariffs are reduced. Such outcome reflects a
profit-seeking behaviour in order for importing firms to
boost their share and their power overall in the market.
On the other hand, Görg and Warzynski (2003) and
Amountzias (2018) find that export-oriented firms in the
United Kingdom tend to charge a higher markup com-
pared to their domestic competitors. They can charge dif-
ferent prices across different markets by taking into
account their power and their ability to sustain a high
price–cost margin over a particular period. This means
that exporting firms may charge a higher markup in
international markets, while keeping their prices low in
domestic markets, thus increasing their market share
through funding transition. De Loecker (2007), De
Loecker and Warzynski (2012) and Polemis and
Fotis (2016) also provide similar evidence arguing that
exporting firms tend to enjoy a higher market share in
domestic markets as they boost their power using reve-
nue earned from international activities.
However, Görg and Warzynski (2006) and
Amountzias (2018) provide no insights about the cyclical
behaviour of markups and thus, there is not sufficient
evidence about the dynamics of this process. Moreover,
the literature of pricing decisions is far from reaching a
conclusive outcome about markup cyclicality and
whether it follows a similar pattern according to the mea-
sures of the aggregate economy. Afrouzi (2016) provides
evidence of procyclical markup ratios when firms have
incentives for implicit collusion rather than competitive
interactions. This means that the size and the bargaining
power in the market influence the cyclicality of markups:
larger firms tend to exploit market power when the econ-
omy is growing, but they engage in price wars when
recession occurs. This outcome is validated by Autor,
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Dorn, Katz, Patterson, and Van Reenen (2020) and
Hong (2018) arguing that large firms are able to exploit
their market power due to the continuous rise in the cor-
porate share of profits and the simultaneous decline in
the labour share of revenue over the last 30 years.
Molnár and Bottini (2010) highlight the significance
of market characteristics across different economies and
how particular institutional factors may influence the
pricing decisions of firms. By estimating the markup
ratios across several EU manufacturing and services
industries, they found that the UK and Scandinavian
(excluding Sweden) sectors tend to be more competitive
compared to Central European countries (Polemis, 2014).
Moreover, Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2012) argue
that the manufacturing industry on average is more com-
petitive compared to the services industry. This outcomes
lies on several market characteristics that each sector
encounters as factors, such as market regulations,
demand elasticity, export-orientation and available
funding, tend to affect markup cyclicality and ultimately,
the pricing strategies of firms shaping the structure of the
market. Therefore, markup behaviour depends on market
concentration and the power of the incumbent firms to
set high markup ratios or engage in price wars to secure
market share and force their competitors to exit the
market.
2.2 | Liquidity constraints and markup
cyclicality
Many empirical studies investigate the behaviour of
markup cyclicality according to liquidity constraints and
how financial barriers may result in market share losses.
As firms struggle to secure additional funding to invest in
the production process, their pricing decisions will have
to reflect the available level of liquidity. Chevalier and
Scharfstein (1995, 1996) provided significant evidence
that liquidity constraints tend to make markups more
countercyclical because firms adopt a pricing behaviour
proposed by Rotemberg and Saloner (1986). This means
that firms reduce their markups in normal times to
attract more customers and increase their market share.
However, markup ratios are increased over downturns to
extract consumer surplus and thus, increase their reve-
nue and boost their liquidity reserves. This behaviour
occurs because firms heavily relying on external financ-
ing are more likely to suspend their investment in market
share building in response to negative demand shocks
that affect pricing decisions and the outcome of competi-
tive interactions (Campello, 2003).
Bottasso and Sembenelli (2001) and Busse (2002) also
argued that financial constraints and industry debt is a
crucial determinant influencing markup behaviour. As
firms become more indebted and dependent on external
financing, they are more likely to cut prices and engage
in price wars in order to increase their market share and
consequently, their revenue. This strategy allows firms to
build their market share in the short-run and exploit con-
sumer surplus through predatory pricing decisions in the
long-run if they establish their presence in the market.
Therefore, the degree of financial constraints and compe-
tition in the market heavily influence markup cyclicality
and the pricing strategies of firms overall.
Braun and Raddatz (2016) provided significant empir-
ical evidence showing that markups tend to increase with
business cycles in more competitive markets where firms
are liquidity constrained in the short-run. Competition
and financing activities appear to have a strong relation-
ship with markup cyclicality as more competitive indus-
tries are more procyclical compared to more
concentrated industries. Consequently, less financially
constrained firms with a relatively low market share tend
to make markups procyclical when they operate in indus-
tries where many firms face significant liquidity con-
straints. This suggestion is in line with predatory pricing
decisions as firms with lower liquidity needs may charge
lower prices over downturns to weaken their competitors
and ultimately, force them to exit the market.
Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010) and Liu and
Mello (2017) also argued according to this line of reason-
ing regarding the effects of financial constraints.
Restricted access to liquidity will force firms to cut invest-
ment in the production process, thus reducing capital
and labour overall. Moreover, if they face short-run liabil-
ities, they will have to improve their liquidity ratio by
selling assets to acquire cash that can be used to finance
those liabilities. Such constraints may force firms to
charge a relatively high markup ratio when they expect
that additional revenue will be used to substitute liquidity
needs unable to be financed through external lending.
For this reason, firms operating in more than one mar-
kets can charge different prices according to the degree of
demand elasticity (Bellone, Musso, Nesta, &
Schiavo, 2010). Markets with more inelastic demand pro-
vide the opportunity for charging higher selling prices
resulting in higher revenue. Therefore, liquidity can be
transferred to highly competitive markets and provide an
advantage over competing firms, especially when
demand is highly elastic.
Overall, markup cyclicality significantly depends on
financial constraints and competitive interactions across
industries. Liquidity-constrained firms operating in com-
petitive environments tend to be procyclical as they may
have large markup declines over downturns. Predatory
pricing strategies may be adopted by more liquidity-
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unconstrained firms to force their competitors out of the
market and ultimately, acquire additional power through
higher market share.
3 | METHODOLOGY AND DATA
COLLECTION
3.1 | Markup ratio estimation
The main indicator of pricing decisions utilized in this
study is the markup ratio charged by firms reflecting the
difference between value added and the costs of produc-
tion. The methodological formulation of the price–cost
margin is attempted by employing the techniques intro-
duced by Hall (1988), Roeger (1995) and De Loecker and
Warzynski (2012). In particular, De Loecker and
Warzynski (2012) provided significant evidence that the
Hall–Roeger approach usually results in underestimated
markups as it takes into account the growth rates of
value added and production costs, thus neglecting the
relationship between variables at levels. Moreover, they
argue that the latter formulation provides a methodologi-
cal advantage compared to traditional approaches, such
as the Lerner index, because it takes into account output
elasticity with respect to production costs. Under this
approach, the markup ratio is more accurate as produc-
tion fluctuations are included in the final estimated
value.
For this reason, the current study employs and
compares both formulations in order to check the
robustness of the final estimates and whether any
major deviations occur in the estimated markup ratios.
In particular, the price–cost margin under both
approaches is obtained by leveraging cost minimisation
of an input factor in the production process. It is
assumed that N heterogeneous firms operate within an
industry having access to a common production tech-
nology. The production function of each firm i, where
i = 1,2,…,N is captured by
Q Ait,Vit,Kitð Þ=AitQ Vit,Kitð Þ ð1Þ
where Q(.)is the production function, Ait is the Hicks-
neutral productivity factor which is heterogeneous across
firms, V = (V1, …, Vj) is the set of variable inputs used in
the production process7 and K is the capital stock. The
Lagrangian objective function for the variable inputs is
given by
L Vit,Kit,λitð Þ= PitVV it + ritKit−λit Q Ait,Vit,Kitð Þ−Qit½ 
ð2Þ
where Pit
V is the price of variable input V, rit is the user
cost of capital,8 λ is the Lagrangian multiplier and Qit is a
scalar.
At this point, the model formulation of Hall (1988)
and Roeger (1995) is captured by
ΔYt =
Δyt
yt
+
Δpt
pt
 
−
Δkt
kt
+
Δut
ut
 
ð3aÞ
ΔXt = amt
Δmt
mt
+
Δpmt
pmt
 
−
Δkt
kt
+
Δut
ut
  
+ alt
Δlt
lt
+
Δwt
wt
 
−
Δkt
kt
+
Δut
ut
   ð3bÞ
where amt = pmtmt=ptyt is the share of intermediate
inputs in output, pmt is the price of intermediate inputs,
alt =wtlt=ptyt refers to the share of labour expenses in
output, wt is the wage rate, pt is the price level of output
and ut is the user cost of capital. ΔYt corresponds to the
growth rate of output per unit of capital, and ΔXt repre-
sents the growth rate of intermediate inputs and labour
expenses per unit of capital. Therefore, the difference of
growth rates between (3a) and (3b) results in the markup
ratio charged by firms.
On the other hand, De Loecker and Warzynski (2012)
depart from this approach and provide the first-order
condition of Equation (2) with respect to the variable
input V
∂Lit
∂Vit
=PitV −λit
∂Q Ait,Vit,Kitð Þ
∂Vit
 
ð4Þ
If this expression is multiplied by Vit/Qit and
rearranged, output elasticity with respect to variable
input V is obtained
βit
V =
∂Q Ait,Vit,Kitð Þ
∂Vit
V it
Qit
=
1
λit
PitVV it
Qit
ð5Þ
This expression captures the dynamics of the produc-
tion process as λ reflects the marginal cost of production
according to the value of inputs. Moreover, given that P
is the price of the final product, then P/λ can be inter-
preted as the price markup over the marginal cost of pro-
duction. Under perfect competition, it is expected that
the price–cost margin is equal to unity, thus P = λ. Under
any form of imperfect competition, the price level should
exceed the marginal cost of production; the higher the
difference, the higher the degree of market power as
firms are expected to charge a price closer to the monopo-
listic price level. Therefore, Equation (5) can be rewrit-
ten as
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μit = βit
V PitQit
PitVVit
ð6Þ
Equation (6) includes two important elements that
shape the value of the price–cost margin: the ratio of rev-
enue to the value of input V and the elasticity of output
with respect to the variable input. The inclusion of the
latter element provides a significant advantage to this for-
mulation as the observation of the market demand func-
tion is not necessary. According to Bils, Klenow, and
Malin (2018), intermediate inputs play an important role
in the formulation of the markup ratio due to their flexi-
bility. If labour compensation is treated as the only vari-
able input, the price–cost margin may result in
overestimated values because a crucial determinant in
the production process is neglected. To this end, the vari-
able inputs taken into account in Equation (6) reflect the
value of intermediate inputs in the production process
and labour compensation. Moreover, Equation (6) must
satisfy the assumption of a production function according
to (1) and the presence of perfect competition in the mar-
ket of inputs.9
The estimation process of Equation (6) necessitates
the observation of total sales PitQit and the total variable
cost of production
P
jPit
V jV it j . Therefore, an industry-
specific Cobb–Douglas production function is employed
by adding logarithms to Equation (1)
qit = ait + βvvit + βkkit + uit ð7aÞ
At this point, the suggestions of De Loecker,
Eeckhout and Unger (2020) are implemented in this
expression to control for simultaneity and selection bias
in order to obtain an unbiased output elasticity value
with respect to variable inputs. This means that the input
demand equation included in the Lagrangian expression
(2) must be taken into account. Finally, if the unobserved
productivity term A depends on the input factors used in
the production process (Olley & Pakes, 1996), Equa-
tion (7a) is transformed into
qit = ait + βvvit + βkkit +wit + uit =ψ t vit ,kitð Þ+ uit ð7bÞ
where wit = w(vit, kit) is the unobserved productivity
term. If that term is assumed to follow an AR(1) process,
the industry specific output elasticity is obtained by the
moment condition
E wit βvð Þvit−1½ =0 ð8Þ
where the estimated value of ψ is used to obtain the value
of output elasticity with respect to variable inputs. This
formulation assumes that variable inputs at time t
respond to productivity shocks. Moreover, the AR(1) pro-
cess reflects a degree of correlation between the current
and lagged values suggesting the persistence of those
shocks over time. Consequently, the firm-level markup
ratio is obtained by
μit = βv
PitQitP
jPit
V jV it j
ð9Þ
3.2 | Model formulation and data
collection
As the main objective of this study is to investigate the
effects of competition and financial constraints on
markup cyclicality, the markup ratio captured by Equa-
tion (9) will be taken into account (De Loecker, Eeckhout
and Unger, 2020). The main aim of this model is to inves-
tigate whether liquidity constraints and market concen-
tration have a significant effect on the pricing decisions
of firms. Braun and Raddatz (2016) introduce the impor-
tance of liquidity provisions to firms operating in concen-
trated industries as firms with higher liquidity reserves
may be able to pursue predatory pricing strategies in the
short-run to increase their share over time. In this case,
market power acquisition will be reflected on the markup
ratio as limited competition will result in a small number
of firms operating in the industry, thus increasing con-
sumer surplus exploitation in the long run. For this rea-
son, it is expected that the interaction between market
concentration and liquidity constraints has a significant
effect on the price–cost margin of the UK firms.
Moreover, a number of control variables will be
included in the model to test the significance of the afore-
mentioned effects on the cyclical behaviour of pricing
decisions. The studies of Konings et al. (2005),
Raddatz (2006) and Braun and Raddatz (2016) are consid-
ered for the formulation of accurate and sufficient indica-
tors of competition and liquidity constraints. To this end,
the functional equation of the model is the following:
markupit = b0 + b1concentrationit + b2liquidity constraintsit +
+ b3profitabilityit + b4investmentit + b5liquidity needsit + uit
ð10Þ
The main rationale captured by Equation (10) reflects
the determinants of pricing decisions that firms must face
by taking into account the competitive behaviour of other
firms and their available liquidity to invest in the produc-
tion process. Moreover, as investment decisions and pric-
ing strategies are set with profitability as the ulterior
motive, it is expected that firms will have to utilize their
available liquidity efficiently in order to cope up with
6 AMOUNTZIAS
market competition. Firms with lower liquidity reserves
will need additional funding to attract more customers
through lower markup ratios and thus, to reduce the
competitive advantage enjoyed by their competitors. To
this end, the effect of market concentration and liquidity
constraints on the price–cost margin is investigated by
Equation (10), when investment decisions, profitability
and liquidity needs are considered as control variables
(Braun & Raddatz, 2016). According to theoretical intui-
tion reflected by the model, the set of regressions that will
be estimated is provided by
μit = μ crit, lcit, invit,prit,cccitð Þ ð10aÞ
μit = μ crit, lcit, invit,prit,dritð Þ ð10bÞ
μit = μ crit, lcit, invit,prit, lritð Þ ð10cÞ
μit = μ git,g crit,g lcit ,g invit,gprit,g cccitð Þ ð11aÞ
μit = μ git,g crit,g lcit,g invit,gprit,gdritð Þ ð11bÞ
μit = μ git,g crit,g lcit,g invit,gprit,g lritð Þ ð11cÞ
where μ is the markup ratio calculated from Equation (9)
for every industry i, g is the growth rate of GDP, cr is the
concentration ratio of each individual firm within a spec-
ified sector and lc is an indicator of liquidity constraints
that firm i faces when it wishes to acquire additional
credit. The control variables correspond to inv which is
the ratio of investment to operating revenue, pr is a prof-
itability indicator and ccc is a proxy of cash conversion
cycle reflecting the time needed for firm i to acquire cash
from trading and financial activities. The short-term
debt-to-operating revenue ratio dr and the labour com-
pensation-to-operating revenue ratio lr are also consid-
ered as indicators of liquidity needs to check the
robustness of this factor on the behaviour of markups.
The dataset consists of 4.040 UK manufacturing and
services firms aggregated into 79 2-digit NACE Rev.2 sec-
tors over 2008–2017 and it was obtained by the Bureau
van Dijk FAME, the AMECO and the World Bank data-
bases.10 The current dataset aims to extend the studies of
Afonso and Costa (2013) and Braun and Raddatz (2016)
and provide significant evidence of the relationship
between markup cyclicality and liquidity constraints
across the UK economy.11,12
The markup ratio is formulated by employing Equa-
tions (3a)-(9) where intermediate inputs and labour costs
are the variable inputs in the production process. Output
is expressed as operating revenue or turnover, the value
of intermediate inputs is reflected by the cost of sales,
labour costs are captured by labour compensation and
finally, the user cost of capital is formulated by ut = [(i
− πe) + δ]Ft, where (i − πe) is the real interest rate, Ft is
the deflator of fixed asset investment for total economy
and δ is the depreciation rate which is equal to 5% across
all industries13 (Martins et al., 1996). The formulation of
the markup ratio in Equation (9) is provided according to
the suggestions of De Loecker, Eeckhout and Unger
(2020) to control for simultaneity and selection bias that
result in an unbiased output elasticity value with respect
to variable inputs. Consequently, the cyclical behaviour
of the markup ratio is observed by multiplying the
growth rate of GDP with the explanatory variables of the
model over 2008–2017.
The concentration ratio is formulated as the operating
revenue of each constituent firm i over the value of oper-
ating revenue within a specified sector. This indicator
reflects the degree of concentration in the market and
can be related with market power expressed by a positive
price–cost margin. Konings et al. (2005) and Feenstra
and Weinstein (2010) also support this argument as more
concentrated industries tend to charge a higher markup
ratio. Market concentration indicators have been consid-
ered by several papers (Amountzias, 2018; Ariga
et al., 1999; Mishra, 2008) and to this end, they are accu-
rate measures of investigating market power exploitation
through higher price–cost margins charged by firms.14
The main rationale of including a concentration index in
the estimation process is to observe how liquidity con-
strained firms operating in less competitive environments
tend to set their markups (Braun & Raddatz, 2016). The
concentration ratio is used in the model because it is a
reliable proxy considering the operating revenue of every
firm in the market, thus capturing forms of heterogeneity
expressed by firm-level characteristics (Newbery, Green,
Neuhoff, & Twomey, 2004).
The variable of liquidity constraints is formulated as
the interaction between liquidity needs and a proxy of
financial development (Braun & Raddatz, 2016). Liquid-
ity needs is expressed as the ratio of inventories over
operating surplus for each firm i (Raddatz, 2006). The
financial development proxy corresponds to the firm-
level liquidity ratio expressed as current liabilities over
current assets. This is an accurate indicator of credit
availability because it reflects the ability of firms to keep
up with their short-run liabilities.15
However, the effect of liquidity needs on markup
cyclicality must be tested even further as liquidity con-
straints is a combination of liquidity needs and financial
development. For this reason, an additional proxy of
liquidity needs is used as introduced by Raddatz (2006)
reflecting the cash conversion cycle of firms. This indica-
tor measures the time needed between the moment a
firm pays for its intermediate inputs and the moment it is
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paid for the sale of the final product (Richards & Laugh-
lin, 1980). Consequently, it captures the funding avail-
ability of a firm reflecting how it is influenced by
increasing gaps between giving and receiving cash
throughout the course of their operations.16 The cash
conversion cycle indicator is formulated as follows:
CCC=
inventory 365
cost of sales
+
account receivables365
operating revenue
−
account payables365
cost of sales
ð12Þ
Two additional indicators are used in order to
increase the robustness of the relationship between
liquidity needs and markup cyclicality. The first indicator
is the ratio of short-term debt to operating revenue and
the second one is the labour compensation over operating
revenue ratio. As the dataset consists of firm-level obser-
vations, those ratios are more accurate and reliable than
aggregate variables because they capture the liquidity
decisions of individual firms. Moreover, the aforemen-
tioned proxies are less volatile compared to the inventory
to sales ratio as the inventory of durable goods producing
firms may be higher and thus, it may result in over-
estimated values.
Finally, as investment decisions and profitability
depend on available liquidity, the capital structure and
the inventory of firms, it is important to investigate how
they tend to affect markup cyclicality and how price–cost
margins change over periods of growth and recession.
For this reason, the ratio of investment to operating reve-
nue and operating surplus before interest and taxation
are added in Equations (10a)-(11c). It is expected that
more profitable firms tend to face lower liquidity con-
straints, thus allowing them to increase investment and
improve the production process. Consequently, such
actions will influence their liquidity needs and ulti-
mately, the behaviour of markup cyclicality.
3.3 | Panel VAR framework
As the dataset consists of 79 2-digit NACE Rev.2 sectors
over 2008–2017, it is expected that a form of cross section
dependence will emerge in the sample. The presence of
this issue is tested by employing the LM and scaled tests
developed by Pesaran (2004). If cross section dependence
is significant, a pooled least squares estimator will result
in inefficient estimates and thus, alternative estimation
techniques must be considered. The tests utilize the aver-
age value of all pair-wise correlation coefficients of the
OLS residuals obtained by the ADF regression of each
variable in the model. The null hypothesis assumes the
absence of contemporaneous correlation, thus rendering
a simple pooled least squares estimator feasible for the
model. The alternative hypothesis reflects the presence of
such correlation under which the random or fixed effects
model must be used (Baltagi, 2008).
Subsequently, the investigation of first-order integra-
tion must be carried out to identify whether any of the
panel series is not stationary. In this case, non-
stationarity results in incorrect inferences and thus, a
panel VAR framework must be used. The unit root tests
applied on the panel series of Equation (10) are
Pesaran's (2007) cross section ADF tests (CADF), where
the initial ADF regression is augmented by the cross sec-
tion average values of lagged levels and first differences.
This transformation considers the presence of cross sec-
tion dependence across the panel set and thus, it provides
more robust estimates compared to the simple ADF
regression. If at least one of the series is found to be first-
order integrated, the presence of cointegration must be
tested in order to explore the presence of a long-run rela-
tionship in the model.
Consequently, Westerlund's (2008) cointegration test
is applied on Equation (10) by considering the presence
of cross section dependence in the model. The group and
the panel Durbin–Hausman test statistics are formulated
according to the presence of contemporaneous correla-
tion and non-stationarity. The null hypothesis of both
statistics reflects the presence of no cointegration and
thus, the absence of a long-run relationship. The pres-
ence of cross section dependence is embodied by a factor
model in which the residual terms are obtained by com-
mon unobservable factors across the constituent indus-
tries (Auteri & Costantini, 2010). Pedroni's (2004)
statistics are also used to check the robustness of the
results provided by the group and the panel Durbin–
Hausman test statistics.17
When cointegration emerges in the model, a panel
Vector Error Correction model is formulated in order to
reflect the long-run relationship amongst the panel
series. Moreover, when the dataset suffers from contem-
poraneous correlation, the most suitable estimation tech-
nique is the common correlated effects (CCE) developed
by Pesaran (2006). The formulation process is similar to
the one of CADF unit root test, where the main regres-
sion is augmented by the cross-section average values of
the sectors over the 10 years of the sample. This approach
allows individual specific error terms to be
heteroskedastic and serially correlated.18 However, it
does not directly consider the presence of correlation
between the explanatory variables and the error term.
For this reason, the generalized method of moments
(GMM) provided by Hansen (1982) and Arellano and
Bover (1995) is also used to check the robustness of the
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final estimates and whether potential endogeneity may
affect the significance of the results.
The final test utilized in the empirical process of
Equation (10) is the non-Granger causality test developed
by Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012). As cointegration
reflects long-run causality and transition to equilibrium,
short-run causality results must also be provided in order
to observe the short-run behaviour of the constituent var-
iables. The test considers stationary series using the Z-bar
statistic for the fixed coefficients of the explanatory vari-
ables under a panel VAR framework. The null hypothesis
indicates the absence of causality in any cross-section of
the panel set obtained by the Wald statistic which is run
for every cross section, thus obtaining the average value
of those statistics.19 The advantage of this test compared
to the traditional Granger causality test (Granger, 1969)
is the assumption that coefficients are heterogeneous
across the cross-sections.
Consequently, by employing the aforementioned
methodological process, the long-run and short-run
effects of competition and liquidity constraints will be
tested on the cyclical behaviour of the price–cost margin.
4 | RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The empirical process of the study is developed in two
steps: the first step calculates the markup ratio for the
constituent 79 2-digit UK sectors over 2008–2017 by
employing Equation (9). The second step uses those esti-
mates and embodies them in Equation (10) which is
tested for the presence of cross section dependence and
first-order integration. If the results of the diagnostic tests
are significant, a panel VAR framework is formulated to
tackle these problems and provide robust estimates. The
main rationale of this process is to initially investigate
the behaviour of the price–cost margin across the UK
economy and ultimately, whether competitive interac-
tions and liquidity constraints significantly shape pricing
decisions and their cyclical behaviour.
Kufel (2016) supports that certain characteristics of
various sectors influence the behaviour of markup
cyclicality. This assumption however, holds for the EU
manufacturing sectors over the last years but not for the
aggregate EU food sector which is dominated by counter-
cyclical markup ratios. In particular, many empirical
studies provide significant evidence of such pricing
behaviour as firms tend to engage in price wars over
expansions in order to increase their market share. Bils
et al. (2018) and Corhay, Kung, and Schmid (2017) sup-
port that markup ratios tend to be countercyclical as
sticky prices and endogenous pricing decisions influence
the risk of financial assets and thus, the long-run
operation of firms in the industry. Hong (2017, 2018) also
mentions that this rationale is dominant especially
amongst small and medium sized firms as they place
lower weight on future returns, thus leading them to
charge higher markups over downturns.
Nevertheless, the cyclical behaviour of markups
depends on various shocks that may influence consumer
preferences or production decisions (Kim & Moon, 2017;
Opp, Parlour, & Walden, 2014). In this case, pricing deci-
sions will be adjusted to such shocks and ultimately, the
interactions between firms and consumers will change in
order to reflect the new conditions in the market. For this
reason, the Hall–Roeger approach (Hall, 1988;
Roeger, 1995) and the markup formulation of De Loecker
and Warzynski (2012) will be used for the estimation of
the price–cost margin across the constituent UK
manufacturing and services sectors.
Tables 1 and 2 and Figure 1 reflect the markup ratios
of the 79 2-digit UK sectors over 2008–2017. The results
verify the empirical findings of Görg and
Warzynski (2003, 2006) and Amountzias (2018)
supporting the competitive nature of the UK sectors. The
highest value is obtained by the manufacturing industry;
however, two of the services sectors appear to exhibit the
highest price–cost margin across the sample.20 The pric-
ing decisions adopted by the UK manufacturing and ser-
vices industry reflect a price–cost margin equal to 19%
which is quite competitive. Moreover, the theoretical sug-
gestions of De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) about the
Hall–Roeger approach (Hall, 1988; Roeger, 1995) are vali-
dated as on average, the estimates of the latter approach
are underestimated compared to the values of the
former.21
Moreover, Table 2 shows the summary statistics of
the operating and liquidity-based indicators included in
the model. Figures 2 and 3 reflect the dynamics of the
constituent variables in the model suggesting that both
industries have significantly grown over the years. As
revenue tends to increase, the services industry overall
faces an increasing trend in operating profit compared to
the manufacturing industry which is growing at a slower
rate following the period over 2012–2014. This outcome
may be reflected by the higher investment-to-revenue
ratio as services firms are more investment-oriented com-
pared to manufacturing firms. Therefore, the former
group of firms will require more liquidity to carry out
their operating decisions.
Finally, the services industry appears to be less con-
centrated than the manufacturing industry, which is con-
sistent with the markup ratios and the values presented
in Tables 1 and 2. This means that a few manufacturing
sectors seem to exercise their market power on the price–
cost margin given that they serve a larger market share.
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TABLE 1 Estimated markup ratios across the UK sectors
UK sectors
Markup ratio
(De Loecker &
Warzynski, 2012)
Markup ratio
(Hall, 1988;
Roeger, 1995)
Manufacturing and
services industries
1.192 1.093
Manufacturing
industry
1.261 1.154
Services industry 1.163 1.067
10 –Manufacture of
food products
1.087 1.091
11 –Manufacture of
beverages
1.647 1.793
12 –Manufacture of
tobacco products
1.304 1.337
13 –Manufacture of
textiles
1.727 1.815
14 –Manufacture of
wearing apparel
1.936 1.981
15 –Manufacture of
leather and related
products
1.319 1.124
16 –Manufacture of
wood and of
products of wood
and cork, except
furniture;
manufacture of
articles of straw and
plaiting materials
1.134 1.116
17 –Manufacture of
paper and paper
products
1.588 1.813
18 – Printing and
reproduction of
recorded media
1.051 1.059
19 –Manufacture of
coke and refined
petroleum products
1.009 1.059
20 –Manufacture of
chemicals and
chemical products
1.323 1.317
21 –Manufacture of
basic
pharmaceutical
products and
pharmaceutical
preparations
2.069 1.901
22 –Manufacture of
rubber and plastic
products
1.206 1.126
1.079 1.177
TABLE 1 (Continued)
UK sectors
Markup ratio
(De Loecker &
Warzynski, 2012)
Markup ratio
(Hall, 1988;
Roeger, 1995)
23 –Manufacture of
other non-metallic
mineral products
24 –Manufacture of
basic metals
1.069 1.029
25 –Manufacture of
fabricated metal
products, except
machinery and
equipment
1.045 1.066
26 –Manufacture of
computer, electronic
and optical products
1.996 2.041
27 –Manufacture of
electrical equipment
1.035 1.046
28 –Manufacture of
machinery and
equipment n.e.c.
1.180 1.070
29 –Manufacture of
motor vehicles,
trailers and semi-
trailers
1.238 1.019
30 –Manufacture of
other transport
equipment
1.043 1.045
31 –Manufacture of
furniture
1.161 1.183
32 – Other
manufacturing
1.313 1.312
33 – Repair and
installation of
machinery and
equipment
1.290 1.240
35 – Electricity, gas,
steam and air
conditioning supply
1.124 1.100
36 –Water collection,
treatment and
supply
1.324 1.298
37 – Sewerage 1.052 0.819
38 –Waste collection,
treatment and
disposal activities;
materials recovery
1.067 1.048
39 – Remediation
activities and other
waste management
services.
1.032 0.921
1.373 1.048
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TABLE 1 (Continued)
UK sectors
Markup ratio
(De Loecker &
Warzynski, 2012)
Markup ratio
(Hall, 1988;
Roeger, 1995)
41 – Construction of
buildings
42 – Civil engineering 1.022 0.960
43 – Specialized
construction
activities
1.076 1.077
45 –Wholesale and
retail trade and
repair of motor
vehicles and
motorcycles
1.049 1.050
46 –Wholesale trade,
except of motor
vehicles and
motorcycles
1.111 1.218
47 – Retail trade,
except of motor
vehicles and
motorcycles
1.163 1.227
49 – Land transport
and transport via
pipelines
1.039 1.029
50 –Water transport 1.166 1.121
51 – Air transport 1.013 1.012
52 –Warehousing and
support activities for
transportation
1.014 1.052
53 – Postal and courier
activities
1.555 1.894
55 – Accommodation 1.953 1.401
56 – Food and
beverage service
activities
1.050 1.100
58 – Publishing
activities
1.192 1.185
59 –Motion picture,
video and television
programme
production, sound
recording and music
publishing activities
1.178 1.239
60 – Programming and
broadcasting
activities
2.947 2.872
61 –
Telecommunications
1.049 1.270
(Continues)
TABLE 1 (Continued)
UK sectors
Markup ratio
(De Loecker &
Warzynski, 2012)
Markup ratio
(Hall, 1988;
Roeger, 1995)
62 – Computer
programming,
consultancy and
related activities
1.102 1.092
63 – Information
service activities
1.009 1.168
64 – financial service
activities, except
insurance and
pension funding
1.047 1.021
65 – Insurance,
reinsurance
and pension
funding, except
compulsory social
security
1.126 0.972
66 – Activities
auxiliary to
financial services
and insurance
activities
1.007 1.005
68 – Real estate
activities
1.162 1.178
69 - Legal and
accounting activities
1.143 1.231
70 – Activities of head
offices; management
consultancy
activities
1.085 1.193
71 – Architectural and
engineering
activities; technical
testing and analysis
1.034 1.014
72 – Scientific research
and development
1.968 2.090
73 – Advertising and
market research
1.224 1.225
74 – Other
professional,
scientific and
technical activities
1.083 1.122
75 – Veterinary
activities
1.078 1.064
77 – Rental and
leasing activities
1.223 1.229
78 – Employment
activities
1.079 1.028
(Continues)
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To this end, it can be concluded that the UK services
industry tends to be more competitive than the
manufacturing industry by focusing on investment and
liquidity acquisition in order to attract more customers
and improve their production overall. Consequently,
according to such evidence, the following step of the esti-
mation process would be to check the cyclical behaviour
of the estimated markup ratios and conclude whether
TABLE 1 (Continued)
UK sectors
Markup ratio
(De Loecker &
Warzynski, 2012)
Markup ratio
(Hall, 1988;
Roeger, 1995)
79 – Travel agency,
tour operator and
other reservation
service and related
activities
1.010 1.121
80 – Security and
investigation
activities
1.077 0.980
81 – Services to
buildings and
landscape activities
1.042 0.980
82 – Office
administrative,
office support and
other business
support activities
1.009 0.997
84 – Public
administration and
defence; compulsory
social security
1.211 1.027
85 – Education 1.204 1.274
86 – Human health
activities
1.008 0.896
87 – Residential care
activities
1.061 1.000
88 – Social work
activities without
accommodation
1.070 0.988
90 – Creative, arts and
entertainment
activities
1.134 1.237
91 – Libraries,
archives, museums
and other cultural
activities
2.485 1.994
92 – Gambling and
betting activities
1.096 1.147
93 – Sports activities
and amusement and
recreation activities
1.432 1.536
94 – Activities of
membership
organisations
1.112 1.050
95 – Repair of
computers and
personal and
household goods
1.037 0.993
96 – Other personal
service activities
1.085 1.059
TABLE 1 (Continued)
UK sectors
Markup ratio
(De Loecker &
Warzynski, 2012)
Markup ratio
(Hall, 1988;
Roeger, 1995)
97 – Activities of
households as
employers of
domestic personnel
1.071 0.998
RP – Residents
property
management
1.177 1.108
Note: The estimated values were obtained by Equations (3a), (3b)
and (9).
TABLE 2 Summary statistics for the UK industries
Manufacturing
and services
industries
Manufacturing
industry
Services
industry
Turnover
(millions)
1,535.3 319.5 903.2
Cost of
intermediate
inputs
(millions)
1,090.8 193.7 897.1
Labour
compensation
(millions)
204.2 41.6 162.5
Employees
(millions)
6.94 1.01 5.94
Investment-to-
operating
revenue ratio
0.27 0.15 0.31
Profitability
(millions)
119.4 29.9 89.4
Liquidity needs
ratio
0.57 0.55 0.57
Concentration
ratio
0.37 0.41 0.36
Cash conversion
cycle index
0.44 0.46 0.44
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pricing decisions follow the fluctuations of business
cycles.
Table 3 provides significant evidence of countercycli-
cal markup ratios across the UK industries. This shows
that firms tend to charge lower price–cost margins over
normal periods to increase their market share and force
their competitors to exit the sector, while they exploit
consumer surplus over downturns as they can charge
higher markup ratios. The result implies that a 1%
increase in the growth rate of real GDP will reduce the
level of markups by 0.07%. This outcome is consistent
with the studies of Corhay et al. (2017) and Hong (2017,
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FIGURE 2 Values of operating variables for the UK manufacturing and services industries. Source: FAME database
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2018) contributing to the literature of countercyclical
markup behaviour.22 Therefore, the next step will have to
incorporate the estimated values of Tables 1 and 2 in
Equations (10a) and (11c) and test the effects of competi-
tive interactions and liquidity constraints on markup
cyclicality.
The first step of the estimation process necessitates
the investigation of cross section dependence in the vari-
ables of the model. The Scaled LM and CD tests
developed by Pesaran (2004) are used to test the presence
of contemporaneous correlation. Table 4 reports signifi-
cant results for the constituent variables in the model val-
idating the presence of contemporaneous correlation.
This means that a simple pooled OLS estimation will not
result in efficient results and thus, additional formula-
tions must be made. The next step includes the identifica-
tion of first-order integration within the panel series. If at
least one of the constituent series is non-stationary, then
a panel VAR framework must be formulated to take into
account this particular problem. Table 5 shows that none
of the panel series are integrated, thus suggesting that a
long-run relationship should persist in the model.
As the presence of cointegration is expected among
the variables of Equations (10a) up to (11c), Table 6 pre-
sents the results of Pedroni (2004) and
Westerlund's (2008) cointegration tests. The results vali-
date the initial insight in favour of a significant long-run
relationship even when the presence of cross section
dependence is considered in the estimation process. This
means that the most suitable approach would be a panel
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
2008 2010 2012 2014 2016In
ve
st
m
en
t-
to
-r
ev
en
ue
 r
at
io
Years
Manfuacture Services
1.25
1.30
1.35
1.40
1.45
1.50
1.55
1.60
1.65
1.70
2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Li
qu
id
ity
 r
at
io
Years
Manufacture Services
0.33
0.34
0.35
0.36
0.37
0.38
0.39
0.4
0.41
2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
C
on
ce
nt
ra
tio
n 
ra
tio
Years
Manufacture Services
392
402
412
422
432
442
452
462
2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
C
as
h 
C
on
ve
rs
io
n 
C
yc
le
Year
Manufacture Services
FIGURE 3 Values of market concentration and liquidity-based ratios for the UK manufacturing and services industries. Source: FAME
database
TABLE 3 Long-run estimate for markup cyclicality
Variables
μ 1.00
growth of GDP −0.069a (−2.25)
Wald test 226.14b [0.00]
R2 0.81
Note: The numbers in parentheses are t statistics. The numbers in
brackets are p values.
aRejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance.
bRejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% level of significance.
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Vector Error Correction model in order to capture the
degree of heterogeneity across firms and deliver unbiased
and efficient results.
The presence of cross section dependence is consid-
ered by using the CCE estimator developed by
Pesaran (2006). Tables 7 and 8 report the long-run esti-
mates capturing the effects of the explanatory variables
on the markup ratio and its cyclical behaviour. In partic-
ular, the relationship between markup cyclicality and
market concentration appears to be negative and highly
significant. This means that more concentrated sectors
tend to follow predatory pricing strategies in normal
periods by charging lower price–cost margins, thus
engaging in price wars over market share acquisition
(Rotemberg & Saloner, 1986). On the other hand, they
are more willing to charge higher markup ratios over
downturns especially when consumer demand is rela-
tively inelastic in order to exercise their power and
exploit consumer surplus. This rationale is also comple-
mented by the negative relationship between the markup
ratio and the concentration index.
This outcome validates the findings of Braun and
Raddatz (2016) and Hong (2017) as they argue that more
concentrated sectors tend to charge more countercyclical
markup ratios because they wish to expand their market
share over expansions and exploit it over recessions.
According to Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), when mar-
ket concentration is high, the firm's discount factor for
future profits is high and thus, markup ratios appear to
exhibit a countercyclical behaviour.23
TABLE 4 Pesaran's cross-section dependence tests
Variables
Scaled LM test CD test
1 2 1 2
Markup 356.00a [0.00] 319.69a [0.00] 12.60a [0.00] 12.52a [0.00]
Growth of GDP 162.00a [0.00] 141.94a [0.00] 86.11a [0.00] 81.11a [0.00]
Concentration 201.74a [0.00] 199.19a [0.00] 33.10a [0.00] 26.53a [0.00]
Cash convertion cycle 383.73a [0.00] 309.28a [0.00] 52.03a [0.00] 54.12a [0.00]
Debt to revenue 318.74a [0.00] 320.25a [0.00] 10.48a [0.00] 11.03a [0.00]
Labour to revenue 297.50a [0.00] 339.61a [0.00] 99.32a [0.00] 94.36a [0.00]
Liquidity constraints 327.86a [0.00] 306.38a [0.00] 21.96a [0.00] 26.32a [0.00]
Investment ratio 322.08a [0.00] 330.30a [0.00] 32.82a [0.00] 25.43a [0.00]
Profitability 319.22a [0.00] 338.00a [0.00] 25.19a [0.00] 28.77a [0.00]
Note: The results are based on Pesaran's (2004) LM and CD tests. The null hypothesis reflects the absence of cross-sectional dependence in
the series. Two models are estimated for each panel series including one and two lags, respectively. The values in brackets are p values.
aRejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% level of significance.
TABLE 5 Pesaran's panel unit root tests
Variables CIPS TCIPS
μ −21.62a [0.00] −24.01a [0.00]
Δμ −97.56a [0.00] −100.4a [0.00]
cr −10.56a [0.00] −12.01a [0.00]
Δcr −88.98a [0.00] −90.24a [0.00]
ccc −17.10a [0.00] −19.72a [0.00]
Δccc −105.5a [0.00] −103.8a [0.00]
dr −27.79a [0.00] −30.18a [0.00]
Δdr −115.7a [0.00] −109.3a [0.00]
lr −18.05a [0.00] −21.32a [0.00]
Δlr −99.40a [0.00] −101.7a [0.00]
g −17.90a [0.00] −16.95a [0.00]
Δg −12.47a [0.00] −14.23a [0.00]
lc −24.56a [0.00] −27.84a [0.00]
Δlc −100.5a [0.00] −97.45a [0.00]
inv −23.23a [0.00] −20.18a [0.00]
Δinv −101.8a [0.00] −103.2a [0.00]
pr −15.30a [0.00] −18.44a [0.00]
Δpr −101.9a [0.00] −98.17a [0.00]
Note: The values are t statistic values. Δ denotes first differences.
Pesaran's (2007) test is conducted including an intercept only.
TCIPS corresponds to the truncated CIPS test. Rejection of the null
hypothesis suggests stationarity in at least one industry of the panel.
The results are reported at lag k = 2. The critical values for the test
are −2.60 at 1% and −2.41 at 5% level of significance.
aRejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% level of significance.
AMOUNTZIAS 15
Subsequently, the proxy variable of liquidity con-
straints implies that more liquidity constrained sectors
tend to charge countercyclical markup ratios. As this
proxy is formulated by the interaction of liquidity needs
and financial development, it reflects the firm's degree of
access to liquid funds. This implies that firms facing more
difficulties in acquiring additional liquidity tend to
charge a lower price level over normal periods in order to
increase their market share and thus, their revenue.
However, they cannot adopt such strategy over down-
turns as liquidity needs and potential revaluated produc-
tion costs do not provide the opportunity for charging a
lower markup ratio. To this end, they are forced to charge
a higher price–cost margin in order to exploit consumer
surplus from their customers by generating additional
revenue serving as a substitute for borrowing.
The countercyclical behaviour of financially con-
strained firms complements the studies of Bottasso and
Sembenelli (2001), Busse (2002) and Bucht, Gottfries, and
Lundin (2002). The main argument lies on the inability
of such firms to cover their costs of production over
downturns by forcing the price level to increase. More-
over, if more liquidity unconstrained firms try to acquire
market share through lower markup ratios, the former
firms must also invest in the quality of their products to
render them appealing to consumers. However, as con-
sumer preferences may change over downturns by focus-
ing on a lower price level than quality, financially
constrained firms may be forced to exit the market.24
Therefore, liquidity acquisition is crucial for entrepre-
neurial activity and countercyclical markups reflect the
attempts of such firms to expand their market share over
TABLE 6 Panel cointegration tests
(10a) (10b) (10c) (11a) (11b) (11c)
DHg 11.16
b [0.00] 10.19b [0.00] 10.31b [0.00] 13.44b [0.00] 11.78b [0.00] 10.90b [0.00]
DHp 14.27
b [0.00] 13.98b [0.00] 11.74b [0.00] 15.26b [0.00] 13.51b [0.00] 11.11b [0.00]
Panel PP − Statistic −52.44b [0.00] −90.66b [0.00] −52.05b [0.00] −64.28b [0.00] −68.51b [0.00] −63.79b [0.00]
Panel ADF − Statistic −22.79b [0.00] −48.76b [0.00] −23.79b [0.00] −37.88b [0.00] −45.39b [0.00] −36.71b [0.00]
Group PP − Statistic −182.1b [0.00] −190.5b [0.00] −191.3b [0.00] −164.2b [0.00] −172.3b [0.00] −169.2b [0.00]
Group ADF − Statistic −63.56b [0.00] −68.85b [0.00] −65.57b [0.00] −60.67b [0.00] −63.81b [0.00] −61.98b [0.00]
Note: DHg refers to the group mean Durbin–Hausman statistic and DHp is the panel statistic as developed by Westerlund (2008). The band-
width selection Mi corresponds to the largest integer less than 4 T100
 2=9
as proposed by Newey and West (1994). The remaining statistics refer
to Pedroni's (2004) statistics. They are one-sided tests run with intercept only. The values in brackets are p values.
aRejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance.
bRejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% level of significance.
TABLE 7 Long-run estimates obtained by the common correlated effects (CCE) technique
Variables (10a) (10b) (10c)
μ 1.00 1.00 1.00
cr −0.035a (−8.84) −0.002 (−0.53) −0.032a (−5.27)
lc −0.141a (−9.92) −0.022a (−17.13) −0.006 (−0.56)
inv 0.147a (2.87) −0.002 (−0.46) 0.002a (4.95)
pr 0.016a (6.67) 0.016a (4.37) 0.012a (3.17)
ccc −0.211a (19.44) — —
dr — 0.004a (6.93) —
lr — — −0.166a (8.80)
Wald test 127.93a [0.00] 368.8a [0.00] 107.04a [0.00]
R2 0.58 0.43 0.59
Observations 40,400 40,400 40,400
Note: The results of the CCE are obtained by employing the common correlated effects technique proposed by Pesaran (2006). The numbers
in parentheses are t-statistics. The numbers in brackets are p values.
aRejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% level of significance.
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normal periods and be prepared for an upcoming
recession.
The remaining parameters of the model are the con-
trol variables of investment, profitability and liquidity
needs. It is expected that investment decisions will follow
a procyclical behaviour as firms tend to invest over nor-
mal periods in order to be able to absorb any negative
shock over downturns.25 The same rationale may also
apply for profitability as firms exercising their market
power are more eager to charge a higher markup ratio to
increase their profit.
To this end, the procyclical behaviour of profitability
is validated by the long-run estimates but the effect of
investment appears to be countercyclical. Even if the
investment-to-revenue ratio results in higher markup
ratios, it seems that more investment-oriented firms tend
to charge countercyclical markups. This outcome is not
very strong as the coefficient in the latter case is only sig-
nificant in Equation (11a). Consequently, investment-ori-
ented firms tend to exploit consumer surplus through
higher markup ratios but their effect on markup
cyclicality may be insignificant. Moreover, more
TABLE 8 Long-run estimates obtained by the common correlated effects (CCE) technique
Variables (11a) (11b) (11c)
μ 1.00 1.00 1.00
g −4.757b (−17.08) −0.462a (−2.13) −1.783b (−7.98)
g * cr −2.459b (−3.13) −2.729b (−3.54) −2.878b (−3.74)
g * lc −0.993b (−18.55) −0.080a (−2.37) −0.001 (1.16)
g * inv −0.029b (−2.64) −0.004 (−1.39) 0.009 (0.92)
g * pr 0.164b (14.84) 0.170b (15.63) 0.145b (13.29)
g * ccc −1.355b (−22.79) — —
g * dr — −0.042a (−2.27) —
g * lr — — −0.538b (−14.75)
Wald test 810.67b [0.00] 279.72b [0.00] 509.30b [0.00]
R2 0.56 0.49 0.50
Observations 40,400 40,400 40,400
Note: The results of the CCE are obtained by employing the common correlated effects technique proposed by Pesaran (2006). The numbers
in parentheses are t-statistics. The numbers in brackets are p values.
aRejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance.
bRejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% level of significance.
TABLE 9 Long-run estimates obtained by the generalized method of moments (GMM) technique
Variables (8a) (8b) (8c)
μ 1.00 1.00 1.00
cr −0.005a (−6.77) −0.002a (−2.73) −0.235 (1.59)
lc −0.095a (−16.93) −0.014a (−3.48) −0.101a (−3.17)
inv 0.163 (1.49) 0.069 (1.53) 0.001 (0.46)
pr 0.011a (20.10) 0.011a (18.52) 0.008a (16.95)
ccc −0.151a (−16.32) — —
dr — −0.004a (−4.77) —
lr — — −0.158a (−11.80)
J − statistic 12.20 [0.06] 5.30 [0.40] 1.04 [0.83]
R2 0.61 0.54 0.58
Observations 36,358 36,358 36,358
Note: The GMM estimator is obtained according to Hansen (1982) and Arellano and Bover (1995). The instruments list in the GMM system
consists of the lagged values of the endogenous explanatory variables. The numbers in parentheses are t statistics. The numbers in brackets
are p values.
aRejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% level of significance.
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profitable firms may engage in price wars over recessions
as their available liquidity will provide them a competi-
tive advantage to force their competitors to exit the sector
and increase their market share.
Moreover, the aforementioned rationale is comple-
mented by the countercyclical behaviour of the liquidity
needs proxies. The cash conversion cycle, the debt to rev-
enue and labour compensation to revenue ratios exhibit a
negative effect on markup cyclicality. This shows that
firms facing higher liquidity needs tend to boost their rev-
enue through lower price–cost margins over normal
periods in order to increase their market share. To this
end, liquidity constrained firms in need for more liquid
funds exhibit a countercyclical behaviour in the market
as they struggle to substitute inadequate liquidity with
additional revenue.
In conjunction with the estimated markup ratios of
the manufacturing and services industries, it can be con-
cluded that the constituent UK firms exploit their market
power whenever there is an opportunity. More concen-
trated sectors tend to engage in price wars over normal
periods to increase their market share, while liquidity
TABLE 10 Long-run estimates obtained by the generalized method of moments (GMM) technique
Variables (9a) (9b) (9c)
μ 1.00 1.00 1.00
g −2.855b (−13.85) −3.015b (−4.96) −4.607b (−4.98)
g * cr −4.463b (−3.06) −4.946b (−3.12) −3.578 (−1.50)
g * lc −3.367b (−13.65) 0.217 (1.79) 0.155 (0.85)
g * inv −0.081b (−3.75) 0.038 (1.73) 0.056a (1.99)
g * pr 0.442b (16.49) 0.402b (14.65) 0.419b (15.39)
g * ccc −5.878b (−14.29) — —
g * dr — −0.053 (−1.61) —
g * lr — — −0.743b (−4.81)
J − statistic 6.77 [0.81] 0.47 [0.95] 2.05 [0.53]
R2 0.60 0.49 0.43
Observations 32,311 32,311 32,311
Note: The GMM estimator is obtained according to Hansen (1982) and Arellano and Bover (1995). The instruments list in the GMM system
consists of the lagged values of the endogenous explanatory variables. The numbers in parentheses are t statistics. The numbers in brackets
are p values.
aRejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance.
bRejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% level of significance.
TABLE 11 Heterogeneous panel non-causality results
Dependent
variables
Sources of short-run causation (independent variables)
Δμ Δcr Δlc Δinv Δpr Δccc Δdr Δlr
Δμ — 3.69b [0.00] 3.98b [0.00] 5.67b [0.00] 1.31 [0.18] 3.96b [0.00] 1.11 [0.26] 1.08 [0.28]
Δcr 3.27b [0.00] — 9.40b [0.00] 6.89b [0.00] −0.17 [0.85] 3.44b [0.00] 0.84 [0.39] 0.83 [0.40]
Δlc 2.96b [0.00] 2.24a [0.02] — 1.51 [0.12] 2.89b [0.00] 1.46 [0.14] 4.98b [0.00] 0.70 [0.48]
Δinv 6.12b [0.00] 1.46 [0.14] 2.01 [0.04] — 4.25b [0.00] 1.43 [0.15] 2.22a [0.02] 1.78 [0.07]
Δpr 2.25a [0.04] 3.06b [0.00] 2.77b [0.00] 2.32a [0.02] — 2.60b [0.00] 1.49 [0.13] 0.06 [0.94]
Δccc 0.71 [0.47] 2.54a [0.01] 4.98b [0.00] 6.08 [0.00] 1.59 [0.11] — — —
Δdr 2.34a [0.01] 1.99a [0.04] 3.48b [0.00] 3.73b [0.00] 1.30 [0.19] — — —
Δlr 1.40 [0.15] 11.05b [0.00] 2.99b [0.00] 2.33a [0.01] 1.77 [0.07] — — —
Note: The values are the Z bar-statistics as reported by Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012). The numbers in brackets denote p values.
aRejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance.
bRejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% level of significance.
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constrained firms try to overcome their lack of sufficient
funding by attracting more customers through lower
price–cost margins. Consequently, the presence of rigidi-
ties in various market factors tend to have different
effects on the markup ratio. This may occur as such rigid-
ities reduce the cyclical behaviour of real prices or
because capacity constraints force firms to coordinate
around static optimal collusive price levels (Braun &
Raddatz, 2016).
This outcome is also validated by employing the
GMM estimation technique in the underlying model.
As the CCE estimator takes into account the presence
of cross section dependence, the GMM considers the
presence of endogeneity across the sample. The results
are presented in Tables 9 and 10 and they bolster the
robustness of the long-run estimates. The differences
in the estimated values are small, the signs are the
same, but some of the explanatory variables become
insignificant when the substitute proxies of liquidity
needs are included. Overall, the empirical insights vali-
date the argument that countercyclical markup ratios
are set by more concentrated industries and liquidity
constrained firms.
The final step of the empirical process uses the
Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) non-Granger causality test
in order to investigate the short-run effects amongst the
constituent parameters of the model. As presented in
Table 11, the markup ratio is caused by every explanatory
variable excluding the labour and debt to revenue ratios.
This shows that even short-run rigidities and market con-
ditions can influence the pricing decisions of the indus-
tries and their competitive interactions in the market.
Pricing decisions also cause the main parameters of the
model, thus reflecting a contemporaneous feedback
between those variables. This means that market struc-
ture, liquidity constraints, profitability and investment
decisions are also caused by the market price level as it is
a crucial determinant of market rigidities. Moreover,
bilateral causality between the market concentration and
liquidity constraints proxies validate the initial purpose
of the model that less liquidity constrained firms tend to
enjoy a competitive advantage over their competitors by
limiting competition and ultimately, increasing their
market share. Finally, the short-run explanatory power of
the liquidity needs proxies is not very strong as only the
cash conversion cycle variable causes markup cyclicality,
while the remaining two have an insignificant effect.
Consequently, the UK manufacturing and services
sectors tend to exercise their market power through price
wars to expand their market share, while liquidity con-
straints force firms to charge countercyclical markup
ratios to acquire additional revenue as a funding
substitute.
5 | CONCLUDING REMARKS
The present study investigates the degree of market
power in the UK manufacturing and services sectors by
employing the markup formulation developed by De
Loecker and Warzynski (2012). The estimation of a panel
Vector Error Correction model provides evidence of the
price–cost margin charged by the 79 2-digit NACE Rev.2
sectors over 2008–2017. Overall, most of the sectors
appear to exhibit a markup ratio close to perfect competi-
tion as the joint value of the aggregated industries is 1.19
suggesting that the selling price exceeds the cost of pro-
duction by 19%. Moreover, the manufacturing industry
charges a higher price–cost margin than the services
industry; however, the highest markup ratios are charged
by services sectors. To this end, the markup values com-
plement the studies of Görg and Warzynski (2003, 2006)
concluding that the UK sectors tend to be quite competi-
tive compared to other economies.
The findings of this study also provide significant evi-
dence that more concentrated sectors tend to charge coun-
tercyclical markups, thus reflecting their intention to
engage in price wars and force their competitors to exit the
market (Haltiwanger & Harrington, 1991). This means that
markup ratios are lower over normal periods in order to
increase market share, but they are significantly higher
during recessions as firms wish to exploit consumer sur-
plus. Sectors with more liquidity constrained firms also
charge countercyclical markup ratios as they intend to
increase their revenue through additional market share in
normal periods (Bottasso & Sembenelli, 2001). This ratio-
nale is also validated by the liquidity needs proxies as rigid-
ities in acquiring additional funding cause firms to seek
additional revenue. Moreover, profitable firms enhance
the procyclical behaviour of markups validating the argu-
ments that firms tend to exercise their market power
through higher price–cost margins. However, investment-
oriented firms may choose not to mitigate investment costs
to the markup ratio over normal periods, thus adopting a
countercyclical behaviour.
The findings of this study have an empirical impor-
tance for the UK economy. More competitive and liquid-
ity constrained sectors experience more countercyclical
markup ratios which may be viewed as the result of
structural and institutional factors unique to the UK
economy.26 These factors shape the pricing decisions of
firms and determine the cyclical behaviour of the markup
ratio in the long run. Therefore, UK firms tend to exer-
cise their market power when they get the opportunity to
do so, either through higher price–cost margins over
downturns or by forcing their competitors to exit the
market over normal periods. To this end, firms with
lower liquidity constraints enjoy a competitive advantage
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which is utilized either through additional investment
decisions or through profitability boosting.
To conclude, the analysis adds value to the literature
of markup cyclicality and the effects of competitive condi-
tions and liquidity constraints on pricing decisions. As the
current dataset consists of UK firm-level data, future stud-
ies could apply the underlying model on different markets
across the globe. Under this perspective, the robustness of
the empirical estimates will be enhanced and the cyclical
behaviour of markup ratios will be investigated.
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ENDNOTES
1 Bottasso and Sembenelli (2001) and Busse (2002) found that price
wars are more likely to start in normal periods by more liquidity
constrained firms as they expect that additional market share will
result in higher revenue. Chevalier and Scharfstein (1995, 1996)
and Campello (2003) showed that firms facing higher liquidity
constraints tend to charge countercyclical markups as they tend
to exploit consumer surplus in normal times.
2 De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) argued that the Hall–Roeger
approach results in underestimated values as it does not take into
account the effects of unobservable productivity shocks. For this
reason, a production function with serially correlated unobserved
productivity shocks must be included in the estimation process
without any assumptions about constant returns to scale.
3 In particular, Green and Porter (1984) argued that this is a devia-
tion from a collusive agreement formed when the market is facing
a downturn. Under demand uncertainty, optimal incentive equi-
librium may involve an episodic recourse to a short-term unprofit-
able solution, such as a price war.
4 However, countercyclical markup behaviour is mainly observed
across concentrated sectors under implicit collusion especially
when firms' discount factor for future profits is high in periods of
high demand (Rotemberg & Saloner, 1986).
5 Bottasso and Sembenelli (2001), Konings, Van Cayseele, and
Warzynski (2005), Görg and Warzynski (2006) and Feenstra and
Weinstein (2010) also provide evidence that markups tend to fall
when firms operate in highly competitive sectors.
6 Nevertheless, markup behaviour may be uncertain in this case.
Usually, higher investment spending is reflected in the final
selling price as consumers will have to pay the cost of qualitative
improvement. If, however, competition is very intense in the mar-
ket, firms may be willing to keep the price–cost margin low for
some time and absorb the cost of investment through additional
funding (Bourlès, Cette, Lopez, Mairesse, & Nicoletti, 2013).
7 De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) treat V as a bundle of variable
inputs and not as individual inputs, thus it is a scalar vector.
8 It is assumed that input markets are perfectly competitive and
thus, PVand r are equal to marginal revenue (De Loecker,
Eeckhout and Unger, 2020). Under any structure of imperfect
competition, either the marginal cost of production would be
higher compared to perfect competition or input prices would be
lower as a result of market power (De Loecker, Goldberg,
Khandelwal, & Pavcnik, 2016).
9 There is no need to assume constant returns to scale, as it is
assumed by Hall (1988) and Roeger (1995). Given that the Hall–
Roeger formulation is estimated in first differences, it provides limi-
tations to the demand function and thus, it results in consistently
underestimated markup values (De Loecker & Warzynski, 2012).
10 The dataset consists of firm-level balance sheets, profit and loss
accounts and financial ratios of the constituent UK manufactur-
ing and services firms.
11 According to the World Bank (2018), the total value added of the
services and manufacturing industry to UK GDP in 2017 was
70.2 and 9% respectively, accounting for almost 80% of economic
activity.
12 The research data used in this study cannot be publicly shared as
they were obtained from a licensed portal and any data sharing
would compromise legal requirements. The data supporting the
empirical findings of this study can be found on the Bureau van
Dijk FAME database and information is provided in the data sec-
tion to know how to source the same dataset. Restrictions apply
to the availability of that data which were obtained under
license.
13 The value of δ could also be calculated by firm-specific deprecia-
tion ratios obtained by the depreciation costs available in the
FAME database (see Molnár & Bottini, 2010).
14 Additional indicators of market concentration could be used,
such as the concentration ratio of the four biggest firms in an
industry or the limited competition indicator captured by the
average of the markup ratios across an industry (Braun &
Raddatz, 2016).
15 Braun and Raddatz (2016) employ a financial underdevelopment
proxy based on the credit deposit by the private sector to banks.
However, given that this ratio reflects the aggregate economy, it
cannot be used in the present study as it does not focus on secto-
rial activities.
16 Raddatz (2006) assumed that inventory stock is renewed in each
production period, thus the inventory stock at that time captures
the equilibrium level of inventory investment.
17 It is worth mentioning that Pedroni's (2004) tests statistics do not
take into account the presence of cross section dependence. This
omission assumes that the panel series do not suffer from con-
temporaneous correlation.
18 The CCE estimator is preferable compared to the Fully Modified
OLS (FMOLS) or the Dynamic OLS (DOLS) estimators as they
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result in inefficient estimates under the presence of cross section
dependence (Phillips & Sul, 2003).
19 The Wald statistic converges to normal distribution under the
null hypothesis when N and T tend to infinity (Dumitrescu &
Hurlin, 2012).
20 They are the sectors of programming and broadcasting activities
(60) and libraries, archives, museums and other cultural activi-
ties (91).
21 However, for some individual sectors this outcome may be differ-
ent as the Hall–Roeger estimates are higher compared to the
ones of De Loecker and Warzynski (2012).
22 This outcome contradicts the findings of Braun and
Raddatz (2016) who argue that markup ratios tend to be
procyclical. However, as Bils et al. (2018) highlight, the exclusion
of intermediate inputs as a production factor from the markup
formulation may result in biased markup estimates.
23 This outcome however assumes the presence of uncorrelated
demand shocks. If a degree of correlation persists, then Hal-
tiwanger & Harrington (1991) argued that incentives for deviat-
ing from a collusive agreement will be lower over normal periods
as punishment may be severe and coordinated.
24 Adams, Einav, and Levin (2009) also argued about the impor-
tance of liquidity restrictions for consumers. Access to short-term
liquidity seems to be a key driver of consumer behaviour and
ultimately, of production decisions as higher short-term demand
tends to increase the markup ratio in the market.
25 The importance of innovation in the production process has
been highlighted by several studies arguing that price-setting
strategies directly reflect changes in investment decisions
(Dixit, Pindyck, & Sødal, 1999; Justiniano, Primiceri, &
Tambalotti, 2010).
26 Such factors include corporate governance structures, informa-
tion technology outsourcing and regulations (Ball, Kothari, &
Robin, 2000; Kshetri, 2007; Terjesen, Aguilera, & Lorenz, 2015).
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